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Abstract
Fog computing is a new paradigm that extends cloud computing and services to the edge of the
network. Although it has several distinct characteristics, however, the conventional fog computing
model does not support some of the imperative features such as D2D communications, which can be
useful for several critical IoT applications and services. Besides, fog computing faces numerous new
security and privacy challenges apart from those inherited from cloud computing, however, security
issues in fog computing have not been addressed properly. In this article, first we introduce a
new privacy-preserving security architecture for fog computing model with the cooperative D2D
communication support, which can be useful for various IoT applications. Subsequently, based
on the underlying foundation of our proposed security architecture we design three lightweight
anonymous authentication protocols (LAAPs) to support three distinct circumstances in D2D-
Aided fog computing. In this regard, we utilize the lightweight cryptographic primitives like one-
way function and EXCLUSIVE-OR operations, which will cause limited computational overhead
for the resource limited edge devices.
Keywords: Fog computing, D2D communication, D2D-Aided fog computing, Anonymity, Lightweight
authentication.
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1 Introduction
Emergence of fifth generation wireless communication (5G) will bring about revolution in the commu-
nications technology. It is envisioned to have a huge numbers of wireless devices (e.g. smart meters,
cars, sensors, etc.) in 5G, where it will provide more than 10Gb/s speed, with 1000 times higher
wireless capacity and save up to 90 percent of energy consumption compared with the current 3GPP
LTE-A system [1]. 5G can also support ultra-high definition visual communications, multimedia in-
teractive, mobile industry automation, vehicle connectivity and other applications and thus achieve a
real Internet of Everything. To support better connectivity and communication link quality in 5G,
small cell concept has been introduced by deploying more small cell base stations (BSs). Furthermore,
device-to-device (D2D) communication has also been considered as a way to enhance the network per-
formance by allowing UEs to communicate directly with their corresponding destinations instead of
using a BS or access point (AP) [2]. The D2D communication also make devices in the same proximity
help each other for the better performance of services.
Now, IoT devices, especially tiny sensors, usually face challenges rooted from limited resources
(e.g., computation power, storage, etc.), which may often impair quality of services (QoS) and user
experience in IoT. To resolve the resource limitation issue at IoT devices, the concept of cloud computing
was introduced as a promising computing paradigm, which can offer services to the end users with
elastic resources at low cost [3]. However, the cloud computing has drawbacks as well. A primary
limitation is delay-the lag between client request and server response, which is regarded as a problem
for latency-sensitive applications that require nodes in the vicinity to meet their delay requirements [4].
Besides, while techniques and devices of IoT are getting more and more involved in people's life, current
cloud computing paradigm can barely support their needs such as low latency, mobility support, etc
To fulfill the above requirements (such as massive connectivity and low latency) of modern ap-
plications, the concept of a new paradigm was introduced, which is known as the fog computing, [5]
(shown in Fig 1). The fog computing model is designed primarily to minimize delay by exploiting the
fog layer, which is the middle layer between the core network and edge devices. Fog computing has its
advantages due to its edge location, and therefore is able to support applications (e.g. gaming, aug-
mented reality, real time video stream processing) with low latency requirements. This edge location
can also provide rich network context information, such as local network condition, traffic statistics and
client status information, which can be used by fog applications to offer context-aware optimization.
Another interesting characteristic is the location-awareness; not only can the geo-distributed fog node
infer its own location but also the fog node can track end user devices to support mobility, which may
be a game changing factor for location-based services and applications. Furthermore, the interplays
between fog and cloud become important since fog can easily gets local overview while the global cov-
erage can only be achieved at a higher layer. In general, a fog computing model consists of three major
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components:(i) edge device (ED), (ii) network access device (NAD), i.e., fog node, in the proximity
of an NAD, and (iii) centralized cloud server (CCS) [3]. EDs can be various sensors or tiny-powered
smart devices collecting information from the certain area, where they are deployed. NAD, which
equips with more powerful computation ability and has sustainable energy supply, can be considered
as access point (AP) in WLAN, base station (BS) in mobile networks, and road side unit (RSU) in
vehicular ad-hoc networks. CCS can be considered as a server of any specific purpose, e.g., authen-
tication server for security, database server for data storage, application server for membership and
service management, etc. In different application scenario, the characteristics of fog components will
be different due to the application requirements. For example, depending on the nature of the IoT
applications, EDs can be treated as either the movable or fixed objects. In an organization that offers
Internet access through Wi-Fi, one may roam around the whole campus with his/her gadgets (mobile
device, tablet, laptop, etc) and get support from several NADs. In that case, EDs can be considered
as movable objects. On the other hand, in smart-grid, smart meters (EDs) are implanted to collect
usage information and send those information to a nearest NAD/substation [20]. Therefore, in that
case, EDs are the fixed objects. Generally, if EDs always needs to interact with CCS then that will
make the CCS busy. In fact, that may incurs the performance of the whole system. The concept of
fog computing can easily resolve this issue. In that case, EDs are allowed to interact with a nearby
NAD, which has more resources such as memory, storage, and computing power. The concept of fog
computing can be useful for several IoT applications, such as IoT-based health-care system [23]. In
that case, a group of sensors (EDs in fog computing) can send their reading to the CCS through an
NAD support, where EDs are connected to the NAD through a short-range communications such as
Wi-Fi, Zig-bee, and Blue-tooth. The concept of fog computing can be useful for various mission critical
applications that require real-time data processing. For example, in a cloud robotic system, the motion
control of a robot depends on the data collected by the sensors and feedback of the control system.
The control system running on the centralized cloud may cause the sense process-actuate loop slow
or even unavailable as a results of communication failure. This is where the concept of fog computing
can be used by performing the required processing for the control system near to the robot. The key
difference between fog and cloud computing is the fog's proximity to the underlying accessing nodes.
The fog computing is localized, while the cloud computing is centralized.
1.1 Problem Statement and Motivation
As discussed, the concept of fog computing offers several notable features. However, we should say
that it is still in its infant stage, and there are many issues which have not been considered yet
including security concerns. First of all, the number of authentication requests will increase since the
handover chance between the fog nodes will increase at EDs. However, the computational requirements
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Figure 1: Fog Computing Paradigm
of authentication requests in conventional fog modeling has not been well addressed, even the fog
devices, i.e., macro or small cell base stations, may need to more helps, compared to the conventional
security protection in 3/4G, where, each authentication need to involve HSS/AuC located in the core
network and the authentication information, including session keys, is computed by it. Although the
authentication works have been ooaded to fog nodes, the performance bottleneck on authentication
may not be alleviated due to the increasing number of requests. Hence, for the aforesaid reasons, the
new type of security architecture is required to satisfy. Secondly, in fog computing, there are many
privacy issues as fog nodes will collect and process various sensitive information, therefore security and
privacy of these information are highly desirable. Besides, the mobility of EDs will require interaction
with several fog nodes, and this may cause privacy issues as well. Therefore, although inclusion of
fog node layer will reduce the load of the centralized cloud server, keeping the footprint of identity
information secretly to the fog nodes is essential for privacy protection.
Our Contributions. The contributions of this article are threefold. First, we introduce a novel
privacy-preserving security architecture for D2D-Aided fog computing model, which can provide veri-
fication of the end-user devices without involving centralized server. Second, based on the underlying
foundation of our proposed security architecture we design three lightweight anonymous authentication
protocols (LAAPs) to support three different circumstances in D2D-Aided fog computing. In order
to do that, we utilize the lightweight cryptographic primitives [6], such as one-way hash function and
exclusive-or operations to support the security even for resource-limited IoT devices [21]. Third, we
provide the comprehensive performance evaluation of the proposed authentication protocols for fog
computing in terms of privacy, computation cost, and communication cost, and verify the feasibility
of the protocols for ensuring the key security features such as anonymity and mutual authentication,
secure key exchange, etc. It can be argued that, our proposed scheme can be useful for various critical
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real-time application scenarios. For instance, in order to access Internet through Wi-Fi Protected Ac-
cess (WPA), end user devices need to be authenticated through a server. Now, in case if the server is
broken or under maintenance then that may cause interruption in Internet access services. Conversely,
in our proposed security architecture for fog computing if the centralized server is broken then also we
can ensure services without any interruption.
Paper organization. The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
first present a new security architecture for D2D-Aided fog computing paradigm (shown in Fig. 2),
subsequently we define the security requirements in designing authentication protocol for D2D-Aided
fog computing paradigm. Subsequently, in Section 3, we introduce three authentication protocols which
support three different scenarios in the proposed security architecture of fog computing. In Section
4, we informally analyze the security of the proposed protocols and then in Section 5 we formally
analyze the security of the LAAP protocols. In Section 6, we provide the performance evaluation of
the authentication protocols in terms of privacy, computation cost, and communication cost, and verify
the feasibility of the protocols for ensuring the key security features for privacy preserving IoT such as
anonymity and identity verifications. Finally, a concluding remark is given in Section 7
2 System and Attacker Models
In this section, we first illustrate a new security architecture for D2D-Aided fog computing paradigm
(shown in Fig. 2), subsequently we define the security requirements in designing authentication protocol
for D2D-Aided fog computing paradigm.
2.1 System Model
In conventional fog computing model, when an ED and NAD need to interact securely, then for
authenticating each others, they may need the support of CCS, and that impairs the performance of
the system in terms of higher latency. Besides, in many application scenarios, such as secure handover
in 5G, we need the support of low latency, and for that it's imperative to have D2D communication
technology. Furthermore, due to the dramatic growth of the number of devices, some applications,
an NAD can be fully overloaded. In order to resolve this issue, NADs may need to interact each
other to ooad some of computation overhead. On the other hand, for roaming services in mobile
communication an NAD can cooperate another NAD to verify the legitimacy of a mobile station
(ED) through the expeditious authentication process. To support all these imperative features in fog
computing, we need fog computing model with cooperative D2D communications, that permits EDs
to interact with each other and even help each other to validate without involving CCS. In this way,
the fog computing layer is expanded from NAD layer only to NAD and ED layers in the generic model.
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Figure 2: Security Architecture for the D2D-Aided Fog Computing Model
The extended fog computing layers will be able to significantly reduce the load at CCS.
Fig. 2 shows a new security architecture for D2D-Aided fog computing paradigm. In this ar-
chitecture, we support the following three authentication scenarios by considering both the fixed and
movable EDs: (i) Initially, for secure interaction, a legitimate ED in a group under the proximity of
an NAD needs to be authenticated with help of CCS. (ii)When the next ED of the same group wants
to interact with NAD, then the most recent ED, who already authenticated by NAD, will help the
next one to be authenticated. (iii) In case of movable ED, when an ED moves to the proximity of a
new NAD then for authenticating ED, the most recently visited NAD will help the new one. Now, as
discussed, our proposed security architecture can even work if the CCS is broken or under maintenance.
In that case, through the subsequent authentication process of (ii) and (iii), the legitimacy an ED can
be verified by NAD. This feature of the proposed scheme, can be useful for various critical applications
such as Internet access through WPA.
2.2 Attacker Model and Security Requirements
An emerging wave of Internet deployments, most notably the Internet of Things (IoTs), requires the
support of mobility, geographical distribution, in addition to location awareness and low latency. The
concept fog computing is proposed in the context of IoT which can be regarded as a useful paradigm
to meet these requirements. However, in order to ensure security and privacy in several critical IoT
services [26] and applications (such as VANETs, Smart Grid, M2M, etc.), there is a requirement of
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privacy preserving secure fog computing model. In this regard, the following security issues should be
addressed properly.
Mutual Authentication: It is an important issue for the security of fog computing since services
are offered to massive-scale end users by front fog nodes. Traditional PKI-based authentication protocol
is not efficient for the resourced-limited EDs and has poor scalability.
Secure Key Exchange: For ensuring communication security, ED needs to share the same
secret communication key with NAD for a particular session. After establishing secret communica-
tion key through secure key-exchange mechanism, both ED and NAD can use this key for ensuring
communication security.
Anonymity: In general, anonymity can be divided into two types: weak anonymity and strong
anonymity [22-23]. The first one can be achieved by hiding the real-identity of the entity using any
encryption or encoding method, but in that case, because of the same cipher or encoded output, an
entity can easily be traced. In case of strong anonymity, the adversary (e.g eavesdropper) cannot trace
the entity (e.g. EDs) by using interactions with them. If the transmitted information cannot satisfy
that property, then an attacker can continuously trace the activity of the entity. This feature can also
help to support location privacy, where EDs ooad their tasks to the nearest fog nodes, to whom the
tasks are ooaded, can infer that fog node is nearby and farther from other nodes. Furthermore, if a
fog edge device utilizes multiple fog services at multiple locations, it may disclose its path trajectory
to other fog nodes, assuming the fog nodes collude. As long as such an ED is attached on a person
or an object, the location privacy of the person or the object will be at risk. If an ED always strictly
selects its nearest fog node for services, the fog node can surely identify the edge device utilizing its
computing resources is nearby.
3 Lightweight Anonymous Authentication Protocol (LAAP) for D2D-
Aided Fog Computing Paradigm
When an ED wants to send it's reading data then ED needs to interact with the nearest NAD. To
ensure privacy preserving issues, it's essential that the interaction should be anonymous. Moreover, for
the the stronger sense of security, it is also important that during anonymous interaction, the entities
should be able to authenticate each other and also can check the freshness of the interacted messages.
Besides, in many IoT applications, EDs are tiny powered, therefore, the security solution for offering
secure anonymous interaction should be lightweight. In this section, we present three anonymous
authentication protocols for three different situations in D2D-aided fog computing. In this regard,
the first authentication protocol is designed for initial authentication in presence of CCS. Other two
protocols are designed for the subsequent authentications in D2D-aided fog computing by considering
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the fixed and movable EDs, respectively. The proposed protocols are designed based on the lightweight
cryptographic primitives such as hash function, EXCLUSIVE-OR, where cryptographic hash function
causes less computational overhead as compared to any symmetric/asymmetric encryption schemes
[16]. The notations used in the proposed scheme are summarized below in Table 1.
Table 1: Notions and Cryptographic Functions
Symbol Definition
AID One-time Alias Identity
{pid1,pid2, ..., pidn} Set of Unlink-able Pseudo IDs
Tseq Transaction Sequence Number
Kec Shared Secret Key between the ED and CCS
GK Shared Group Key
CK Communication Key
tk Temporary Key
h(.) Secure One-way Hash Function
⊕ EXCLUSIVE-OR
|| Concatenation Operation
3.1 Registration Phase
Conceive, there is a group of edge devices have been deployed in a particular area, where they need to
register into the CCS. Our registration process consists of the following steps:
(1) The i-th ED EDi requests to be registered into CCS through a secure channel.
(2) CCS maintains a global counter (gcount) of 64-bit. For any request this counter is incremented
by one. After receiving request from EDi, the CCS increments the value of gcount by one and
subsequently, generates a transaction sequence number Tseq = gcount, along with a secret shared key
Kec and a set of un-linkable pseudo IDs PID ={pid1, pid2,,...,pidn,} for EDi, and then provides these
parameters along with the group key GK to the EDi through the secure channel, by maintaining a
copy of these parameters in its database.
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3.2 Initial Authentication Protocol for D2D-Aided Fog Computing (LAAP1)
This Phase of the proposed scheme will be executed when the first ED EDi , in a group wants to send
its data reading or the field information to the CCS with the help of a nearest NAD. Besides, we
recommend this Phase to be executed when any uncanny situation arises. For example, NAD cannot
validate the legitimacy of an ED with the help of other ED, then NAD needs to interact with CCS
through this Phase. This Phase consists of the following steps:
Step 1: EDi→NAD: MA1 : {AID, Nx, Tseq}.
EDi generates a random number Ne and computes Nx =Ne⊕ Kec, a one-time alias identityAID =
h(IDEDi ||Kec||Tseq), and then sends AID along the transaction sequence number Tseq to a nearest
NAD, where IDEDi , Kec, h(.) represent the identity of the edge device, shared secret key, the random
number generated by the edge device, and one-way non-collision hash unction, respectively. Note that,
in case of loss of synchronization EDi needs to select one of the unused pair of (pidj , kemj ) and assign
AID = pidj , kemj = Kec. In that case, EDi need not to send any transaction sequence number Tseq
in MA1 .
Step 2: NAD→ CCS : MA2 :{Fwd. MA1}.
Since, NAD has no information about the EDi , hence it forwards the request message MA1to the
CCS.
Step 3: CCS→ NAD : MA3 :{e1, e2, ResCCS, CK}.
After receiving the message MA2 , CCS at first finds the transaction sequence number Tseq in
its database, and then retrieves IDEDi , Kec from that particular row of the database. Hereafter,
CCS computes and validates the request parameters like AIDED. . If the verification is successful
then the CCS generates a communication key CK and a new transaction sequence number Tseqnew.
Subsequently, EDi computes e1= h(Kec || Tseq)⊕Tseqnew, e2= h(Kec || IDEDi)⊕CK, ResCCS = h(e1
|| e2 || Kec), and updates Tseq = Tseqnew. Finally, CCS forms a response message MA3 and sends to
the NAD.
Note that, if CCS cannot find the Tseq, provided by EDi in its database, then CCS will try
to recognize pidj in AID. In that case, the system (CCS) can comprehend that there is a loss of
synchronization with EDi . Now, if the system can recognize pidj then it will proceed for any futher
computation and at the end it sends a response message MA3 to NAD.
Step 4: NAD→EDi :MA4 :{e1, e2, ResCCS , ResNAD, TN , Rn}
Upon receiving the response message MA3 with the communication key CK , NAD generates a
Track No. and a random number Rn, and computes TN = h(CK || Rn)⊕Track No., ResNAD =
h(Track No.‖ CK ‖ Rn). Subsequently NAD forms a response message MA4 , then sends MA4 to the
edge device EDi .
Step 5: Verification at EDi
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After receiving MA4 , EDi first validates the response parameters (ResCCS, ResNAD) received from
both the NAD and CCS, respectively. If the verification is successful then EDi first decodes Tseqnew,
CK and updates Tseq = Tseqnew. Hereafter, EDi broadcasts the random number Rn to other group
members. Finally, EDi needs to encode it's identity by ED
∗
i = EDi
⊕
h(Rn || GK) and then stores
it into a common group database (Table II), which consists of two fields i.e. the last edge device
communicated with NAD and it's status, which can be either Idle or Busy . Note that, when
an ED interacts with a NAD while NAD is busy to handle other requests, the NAD will forward the
request of the later one to another NAD. In this way, loads at NADs can be balanced, which is one of
the important feature of the fog computing model. It should be noted that, our LAAP1 authentication
scenario can be observed in the applications, where three different types of entities are involved during
authentication process. The detail procedure of this Phase is depicted in Fig. 3.
Run-Out Situation:
Now, in case when all the pseudo IDs are used up then EDi needs to send a Run-Out request i.e.
RO1 : {[EDi || TED || GK]EGK , GID, TED}, where TED, and GID denote the timestamp and group
identity of EDi , respectively. Upon receiving RO1, CCS first checks the timestamp TED. If it is valid
then CCS finds the GK based on GID. Subsequently, CCS generates a set of new pseudo IDs PIDnew
=(pid1, pid2, ...,pidn) and forms a response message RO2:{PIDnew, ResCCS, TCSS}and sends RO2 to
EDi . The detail procedure of this Phase is depicted in Fig. 3.
Table 2: Common Group Database
Last Communicated Edge Device Status
ED∗i Idle/Busy
3.3 Subsequent Authentication Protocol with the Co-operation of EDs in D2D-
Aided Fog Computing (LAAP2)
It should be noted that, in the above fog computing model, CCS needs to involve for every device
request, which is a conventional approach. Since the number of IoT devices are increasing everyday.
Therefore, dealing with a huge number of requests will increase the load of CCS and that may also
impair the performance of the entire system. On the other hand, since the number of IoT devices are
increasing everyday, dealing with a huge number of requests will increase the load at CCS, and this
may impair the performance of the entire system. On the other hand, in D2D-fog computing model,
devices in the same proximity can help each other for the better performance of security services, e.g.,
authentication. Therefore, we introduce the cooperative D2D communication support, where EDs can
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Figure 3: Initial Authentication Protocol in Presence of CCS for D2D-Aided Fog Computing
verify each other by preserving the privacy from any eavesdropper. In this case, we assume that both
EDi and EDj share a link key Kij , through Blom's scheme [24], which is based on MDS (Maximum
Distance Separable) code. For a general introduction to MDS codes see [25]. Blom's scheme uses
a public (λ + 1) × N matrix G and a private matrix N×(λ + 1) matrix D which is generated over
GF(q) and N is the size of the group, where q is a prime power. This solution is λ- secure, meaning
that keys are secure if no more than λnodes are compromised. In order to do that, G must have
(λ+1) linearly independent columns. Then the Key matrix can be defined as a symmetric matrix K=
(D.G)T .G. After deployment, all EDs broadcast their column instances of G and row instances of
matrix (D .G)T , that allows any pair of EDs i and j to compute the link-keyKij = rowi×columnj and
Kji = rowj×columni, respectively. For detailed analysis and proofs the interested reader is referred
to [24]. This phase of authentication process consists of the following steps:
Step1: EDj → EDi : MB1 : {AID, GAuth, Tseq}.
When an edge device EDj wants to interact with it's nearest NAD, then NAD needs to verify
the legitimacy of EDjwith the help of the most recently interacted EDs, EDi . Therefore, it's assumed
that the last interaction between the EDi and the NAD was successful. Now, in order to interact with
NAD, EDj at first encodes it's identity into a one-time alias identity AID = h(IDEDj ||GK || Tseq)
and generates a group authentication request GAuth =h(IDEDj || Rn|| GK || Kij), and subsequently
it checks the Status field of the common group database. If the status field is Idle then EDj needs
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to decode ED∗i by using the group key GK and the random number Rn and then immediately sends
a request message MB1to the EDi . Otherwise the edge device EDj needs to wait for the new entry of
Last Communicated Edge Device (as shown in Table 2).
Step 2: EDi→NAD: MB2 :{TrackNo. ReqEDi ,T seq, tk∗}.
After receiving the request message MB1 , EDi decodes IDEDj from the alias identityAID and
subsequently checks the parameter GAuth, to verify the legitimacy of EDj and also to find that whether
it belongs to the same group or not. If not, then EDi terminates the interaction. Otherwise, EDi
generates a temporary key tk and encodes tk by using CK. Finally, EDi forms a request message MB2
based on the Track No. (received from NAD) and communication key CK and then sends MB2to
NAD.
Step 3: NAD→EDi :MB3 :{e1, e2, ResNAD, Rn}.
Upon receiving the response message MB2 , NAD at first validates the Track No. and decodes tk
from tk∗. Hereafter, NAD generates a new communication key and track number (CKnew,T racknew)
and a random number Rn and then encodes the CKnew and Tracknew with the temporary key
tk(received from EDi) and finally sends them along the response parameter ResNAD and Rn to EDi .
Step 4: EDi→ EDj :MB4 :{e1, e2, ResEDi , Rn , tk
#}.
After receiving MB3 , EDi at first validates ResNADand then encodes the temporary key tk by
using the group key GK and link key Kij , i.e.tk
#=h(GK || IDEDi || Kij)⊕ tk. Hereafter, EDi forms
a response message MB4 and then sends it to EDj .
Step 5: Verification at EDj
Upon receiving MB4 ,EDj first checks the response parameter ResEDi and subsequently decodes
tk from tk#, Tracknew from e1, and CKnew from e2 and then broadcast the random number Rn to
other group members. It should be noted that here the random number Rn is used for replay attack
protection. The detail procedure of this Phase is depicted in Fig. 4.
It should be noted that, even though our LAAP2 has been designed for the fixed edge devices.
However, the protocol can also provide authentication support for the limited range of mobility ap-
plications. For example, Internet access through Wi-Fi in a campus. In that case, a set of EDs can
form a group and then during roaming in the campus, one ED who is already authenticated can help
another one to be authenticated and get Internet services.
Now, to enhance the security level of the proposed scheme it is imperative to update the group key
in regular interval and also when one of the following events occurs: (i) a new ED joins the group; (ii)
a joined ED leaves the group. In that case, we directly adopt the secure hash based key management
protocol of [9].
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Figure 4: Subsequent Authentication Protocol with the Co-operation of EDs in D2D-Aided Fog Com-
puting
3.4 Subsequent Authentication Protocol with the Co-operation of NADs in D2D-
Aided Fog Computing (LAAP3)
When an ED moves to the proximity of a new NAD (say NADi) then to authenticate ED, the most
recently visited NAD (say NADj )will help the new one. In that case, we assume that the initial
authentication process between ED and NADi through LAAP1 was successful, and ED received valid
authentication token fromNADj i .e. Token = {(NADj || Tnad || Track No. || Sign)EGKnad , where
Sign = h(NADj || GKnad || TN || Track No.). Furthermore, it should be noted that, the key idea
behind fog computing is to deploy several NADs, to nearby end users. Such that, end users can get
better prominence especially in terms of latency and throughput. In that case, we assume that all
the NADs belongs to CCS shares a group key GKnad. This group key can be used to validates the
legitimacy of the group members. Here, we further assume that, for secure execution of this protocol
(LAAP3) NADs need to help each other to check the validity of EDi . However, NADs should not
collude each others to collect the footprint of shares a group key GKnad. This group key can be used
to validates the legitimacy of the group members. Here, we further assume that, for secure execution
of this protocol (LAAP3) NADs need to help each other to check the validity of EDi . This phase of
the authentication process consists of the following steps:
Step1: EDi → NADi : MC1 : {Track No., ReqED,Ne, Token}.
EDi generates a nonceNe and computes ReqED =h(Track No. || Ne || CK). Finally EDi constructs
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a request message MC1 and sends to NADi .
Step 2: NADi→NADj : MC2 :{TrackNo., ReqED,T seq, NADi ReqNAD}.
Upon receiving the message MC1 , NADi first decrypts the Token and gets the information about
NAD i.e.NADj , to whom EDi has most recently visited. Hereafter,NADi checks the time stamp (TNAD)
and the signature (Sign) inside the token, in order to validate Token. If any of the parameter inside
the Token is invalid then NADi terminates the execution of this protocol. Otherwise, NADigenerates
a nonce Nd and computes ReqNAD =h(NADi || Nd || GKnad). Finally, NADi forms a request message
MC2 and sends it to NADj .
Step3:NADj→NADi : MC3 :{e1, e2, ResED, ResNAD}.
Upon receiving the messageMC2 ,NADj first checks the Track No., ResED, ResNADwhether they are
valid or not. If not, then the system (NADj ) will terminate the execution of this protocol. Otherwise,
NADj randomly generates a communication key CKnew and computes ResNAD = h(e1|| e2 || GKnad),
ResED = h(e1|| CK || Track No.). At the end, NADj forms a response message MC3 and sends the
message to NADi .
Step4: NADi→EDi :MC3 :{e1, Rn, ResED, ResNADi , Tn, Tokennew}.
After receiving MC3 , NADi first validates the response parameter ResNAD and subsequently de-
codes the communication key CKnew from e2. Hereafter, NADi generates a new track numberTracknew,
random numberRn, and a token Tokennew = {(NADi|| Tnad || Tracknew || Sign)EGKnad , where Sign =
h(NADi|| GKnad|| Tnad|| Tracknew). After that, NADi computes Tn = h(CKnew || Rn)⊕Tracknew,
ResNADi = h(Tracknew‖ CKnew‖ Rn) and forms a responseMC4 and sends to EDi . It should be noted
that, the parameter Tokennew will be useful once the EDimoves to a new NAD.
Step5: Verification at EDi .
After receiving MC4 , EDi first validates the response parameters (ResED, ResNADi ) received from
both the NADj and NADi , respectively. If the verification is successful then EDifirst decodes CKnew,
Tracknew and keep them for further communication. Otherwise, EDi aborts the execution of this
protocol (LAAP3). The detail procedure of this Phase is depicted in Fig. 4.
It should be noted that, since both LAAP2 and LAAP3 can support secure handover of an UE
(user equipment) in mobile communication, they can be alternatively used. The choice among them
depends on the performance and network environment. For example, in 5G, the establishment of a
secure communication using LAAP3 may provide low latency but it requires an interaction between
NADs via the interface X2, which causes higher communication cost as compared to LAAP2 . The
secure communication process of LAAP2 could be more feasible when UE can find any authenticated
UE to prove its legitimacy. It is argued that the concept of cooperative interactions among the
NAD-to-NAD and ED-toED will not only resolve the performance bottleneck issue in conventional fog
computing but also support the security requirements raised by the security architecture for D2D-aided
fog computing paradigm.
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Figure 5: Subsequent Authentication Protocol with the Co-operation of NADs in D2D-Aided Fog
Computing
4 Informal Security Analysis:
In this section, we will demonstrate that our proposed scheme can ensure various imperative security
requirements such as mutual authentication and key exchange, privacy against eavesdropper, etc. which
are greatly important in fog computing.
In LAAP 1:
Accomplishment of Mutual Authentication : CCS authenticates EDi by using the parame-
ters such as Tseq and AID. If any of the parameters is invalid then CCS terminates the authentication
process. On the other hand, using the legitimate response parameters ResCCS in MA4 , EDi authenti-
cates CCS and NAD, respectively. The security of mutual authentication is based on AID and ResCC ,
where AID = h(IDEDi ||Kec||Tseq) and ResCCS = h(e1||e2||Kec), Kec is the long-term secret only
known by CCS and EDi, e1 = h(Kec||Tseq)⊕Tseqnew, and e2 = h(Kec||IDEDi ||Ne)⊕CK. Since Tseq
is only known by EDi and CCS and changed in every session, and e2 is computed with a nonce Ne,
they can be regarded as challenges of mutual authentication to CCS and EDi to prevent from replay
attacks, respectively. Moreover, we consider h(·||Kec||·) and h(·|| · ||Kec) as two pseudo-random func-
tions, where the outputs of pseudo-random functions are indistinguishable from the outputs of random
functions. Hence, with the known inputs, IDEDi , Tseq, e1, and e2, the probability of producing the
corresponding outputs without those pseudo-random function is negligible.
Accomplishment of Key Exchange : In our proposed mutual authentication and key exchange
scheme LAAP1, CCS generates communication key CK and then distributes EDiand NAD through
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the encoded parameter e2 and secure channel, respectively. As discussed, after secure key-exchange,
for communication security, both EDiand NAD can use CK to ensure privacy, integrity, and freshness
of the sensitive data.
Accomplishment of Privacy Against Eavesdropper (PAE): The proposed scheme LAAP1
has maintained the one-time-alias feature ( using AID), where there is no direct relationship between
the aliases. Furthermore, since most of the parameters exchanged between the participants are one-
time. This approach of the proposed scheme is quite effective for ensuring PAE support.
In LAAP 2:
Accomplishment of Mutual Authentication : NAD authenticates EDj through the assistance
of the most recently communicated edge deviceEDi . In that case, NAD needs to verify the legitimacy
of the request parameter ReqEDi . EDi authenticates NAD using the response parameter ResNAD. On
the other hand, EDi can verify the legitimacy of EDj , using the request parameter GAuth, which can
verify whether EDj belongs to the same group as EDi . Now, EDj authenticates EDi as well as NAD
using the response parameter ResEDi . In this way, all three participants in LAAP2 authenticate each
other.
Accomplishment of Key Exchange : In LAAP2, NAD generates a new communication key
CKnew and then encodes that by using the temporary key tk , which is generated by EDi . In order to
get tk, EDi needs to use its group key GK.
Accomplishment of Privacy Against Eavesdropper (PAE): Similar to LAAP1, LAAP2
ensures PAE using the AID approach. Besides, like LAAP1, all the messages exchanged between the
participants are random or one-time. Hence, an outsider cannot trace the communication. In this way,
we achieve PAE for EDi .
In LAAP 3:
Accomplishment of Mutual Authentication : We first recall the environment in LAAP3.
EDimoves from NADj to NADi , then the current NAD NADi needs to authenticate EDiwith the
help ofNADj . In that case, NADj authenticates EDi using the request parameter ReqED, where the
legitimacy of the parameter is validated by using CK. NADj and NADi authenticates each others using
the request parameterReqNAD, and response parameter ResNAD, respectively, where the legitimacy of
these parameters are based on the group key GKnad. Now, EDi authenticates both NADi and NADj
using the parameters ResED, ResNADi , respectively.
Accomplishment of Key Exchange : In LAAP3, NADj generates a new communication key
CKnew and then distributes the encoded CKnewamong NADi and EDi . In order to decode that,
EDineeds to use the valid CK, and NADi needs to use the valid group key GKnad.
Accomplishment of Privacy Against Eavesdropper (PAE): To communicate with NADi ,
EDi uses the Track No., only NADj can recognize that. Besides, all the parameters inMC1are one-time,
therefore it will be difficult for an outsider to trace EDi .
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It should be noted that, to support location privacy feature in our proposed security architecture
for D2D-aided fog computing, each time EDi needs to choose LAAP1 to interact with NAD. Since,
all the parameters in MA1are one-time. Therefore, even if EDi has already been interacted with a
particular NAD before, but, it cannot comprehend the EDi . However, in this regard, each time CCS
needs to be involved. Therefore, it impairs the performance of the system. Furthermore, in LAAP2,
since EDs are assumed to be fixed objects. Hence, we need not to consider the location privacy feature
in this scheme.
5 Formal Security Analysis of the Proposed Scheme
Bellare and Rogaway [10] first proposed the theoretical security proof for an authentication and key
exchange protocol with a symmetric two-party case, which is known as BR93-Model. Now, in our
LAAP1 scheme, the communication between each serving NAD and the CCS is assumed to be secure,
so that serving NAD and CCS can be regarded as a single network. On the other hand, in LAAP2,
although two EDs in a group are involved, however, NAD needs to proof the legitimacy to last com-
municated ED. In this case, we can regard EDi and EDj as single entity. Thus both of our security
model will fit the symmetric two-party setting on BR93-Model.
5.1 Complexity Assumptions
The security of our proposed scheme is based on the secure one-way hash function, which can be
regarded as a pseudo-random function [10]. Therefore, we first introduce the security definitions of
pseudo-random function and show their game environments for the simulations of the security proofs
of the proposed protocols. The simulation of the security proofs have to follow the security definitions
and the game environments of the pseudo random function.
Definition 1 Let f be a polynomial-time computable function and AdvH = |Pr
[
Hf = 1
]
−Pr
[
Hf
′
= 1
]
|
denote the advantage of that an algorithm H, controlled by a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary
A, distinguishes f from another functionf ′. We say that f is a (t, q, ∈)-secure pseudo-random function
if no feasible algorithm H, making at most q oracle queries to f or a truely random function f ′and
running at most t by plying the following game, can distinguish f from f ′ with the advantage AdvH≥∈,
where q is the polynomial number of oracle calls of A.
Initialization: A challenger C interacting with A picks a random bit b∈ {0, 1} to determine the
function fb where f0 is a pseudo-random function and f1 is a truely random function [7-8].
Training Phase:A issues q queries with x1,...,xq to C, wher e xi ∈ {0,1}*. The challenger
responds these queries by sending fb(xi) to A for i=1,...,q. where fb(xi) ∈ {0, 1}
l andl is a fixed
positive integer.
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Guess: A outputs b
′
∈ {0,1} as a guess of b, Awins this game if b′=b. We define the advantage
of Awinning the game as Advf0,A= |Pr
[
b
′
= b
]
− 12 |.
According to the pseudo-random function assumption no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary
can win the above game with non-negligible advantage.
5.2 Security Model and Notations
Protocol Participants.
∏s
X,Y denotes the oracle which plays the role of X to interact with Y in
session s, and
∏t
X,Y denotes the oracle which plays the role B to interact with A in session t, where
X,Y ∈ I, s∈N , I being the set of identities of the of the players (such as EDs, NAD, and CCS) who
participate in the protocol and N being the set of positive integers.
Protocols. As we mentioned before, although the proposed protocols (LAAP1 and LAAP2) are
three-party authentication and key exchange scheme. However, the protocols can be reduced as de-
facto two-party setting protocols. Therefore, we define a two-party authentication and key exchange
protocol.
Definition 2 A two-party authentication and key exchange protocol P, can be formally specified
by an efficiently computable function
∏
with the following inputs:
k : Security parameter length used in the protocol.
X : Initiator's identity of P , where X ∈ I .
Y: Intended partner's identity P , where Y ∈ I .
a: Secret information, where a∈ {0, 1}*.
K The conversation in P so far.
r: The random coin flips of the sender or initiator, where r ∈0, 1+
The output of
∏
(k , X ,Y , a, K, r) = (m, δ, α) can be defined as follows:
m: The subsequent message to be sent, where m ∈{0, 1}
⋃
{*}, where * denotes that the initiator
sends no message.
δ: The decision, where δ∈{A, R, *}, where A, R, * denote accept, reject, and no decision,
respectively.
α : The private output, where α ∈0, 1∗
⋃
{*}, * denotes that the initiator does not have any private
output.
5.3 Adversary Model
While execution of the protocol P , an adversary A, who is a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing
machine, can be able to control the communication channel between X and Y, by eavesdropping
the messages sent by X and Y and modifying the messages produced by X, and Y, and compromise
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session secrets shared between X, and Y in the real environments. These behaviors can be modeled
by the following queries.
Execute(
∏s
X,Y ,
∏t
Y,X): The query models all kinds of passive attaks, where a passive adversary
can intercept all the data exchanged between
∏s
X,Y and
∏t
Y,X in a session of P .
Send(
∏s
X,Y , m): This query models active attacks, where an adversary sends a message m to∏s
X,Y and obtains the response message according to the proposed scheme.
Reveal(
∏s
X,Y ): The query models the exposure of session key (known session key attacks) in a
particular session s.
Corrupt(
∏s
X,Y ): This query models the revelation of the long-term secret key. This query models
passive attack.
Test(
∏s
X,Y ): When
∏s
X,Y accepted and shared a session key, adversary A can make this query
and try to distinguish a real session key from a random string.
5.4 Security Definitions
Mutual Authentication Security: First we briefly review the definition of matching conversation [10-11].
Definition 3(Matching Conversations): An authenticated key exchange protocol P is a message-
driven protocol and the goal of P is to achieve matching conversation. We first define a protocol session
within a party X as (X, Y , s, role) where Y is the identity of X's partner, s is a session id, and role
can be either initiator or responder. A P of two protocol sessions within a partyX and a party
Y are of the form (X , Y , s, initiator) and (X , Y , t , responder), respectively. Two session are
said to be matching conversation involving X and Y if their session id's are identical and the initiator
and responder are each of them. A protocol P consists of more than two sessions and each pair of
sessions in sequence is matching conversation. P is said to be a protocol of matching conversation.
The definition of matching conversation is of the same functionality as defined in [10-11].
Now, we define mutual authentication based on the definition of matching conversation as follows.
P is a mutual authentication protocol if for any polynomial time adversary A, 1) matching conversation
implies acceptance and 2) acceptance implies matching conversation. The fist condition says that if
the sessions of two parties consists of a matching conversation, the parties accept the authentication
of each other. The second condition says that if each party accepts the authentication with the other
party in a conversation, the probability of no matching conversation is negligible.
Definition 4 An authentication protocol P is MA-Secure (i.e. P satisfies MA-Security) if
(1)Matching conversation implies acceptance:
If oracles
∏s
X,Y and
∏t
X,Y have matching conversations, both oracles accept and
(2)Acceptance implies matching conversations:
The probability of No −MatchingE(k) is negligible, where k is a security parameter and No −
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MatchingE(k) is the event that their exists i, j, X , Y such that
∏i
X,Y accepted but there is no oracle∏j
Y,X which is engaged in a matching conversation.
The event No −MatchingE(k) can also be denoted as SuccMAP (X ) which is the probability of
that a polynomial-time adversary X can successfully impersonate one of the two interactive entities
who want to authenticate each other in P .
Authentication Key Exchange (AKE) Security: During the execution of an MA-Secure
authentication protocol P, a polynomial-time adversary X interacts with two fresh oracles:
∏s
X,Y and
its partner
∏t
Y,X . At the end of the execution, A issues a Test query to one of the two fresh oracles.
Then the real session key or a random string is returned to X according to the value of a random bit b.
Finally, X outputs a bit b′ and terminates the game. The AKE-Advantage AdvAKEP (A) is defined
as |Pr [b = b′]− 1/2|. We give a formal definition of AKE-Security below:
Definition 5 A protocol P is AKE-Secure if P satisfies the following properties:
(1)A being adversary engages in the execution of P with
∏s
X,Y and its partner
∏t
Y,X . Then both
oracles can accept and share the same session key each other.
(2)P is MA-Secure.
(3)For every probabilistic polynomial-time adversary X , AdvAKEP (X ) is negligible.
When a Test query is issued before finishing the execution of the protocol, the game is played as
the above definition if the session key is generated by any one of the two fresh parties. Otherwise, the
Test query wil be rejected.
5.5 Security Proofs
Our proposed scheme is based on hash function, that we can consider as secure pseudo-random function.
In this sub-section, we will show that the proposed protocols are provably secure based on pseudo-
random function assumption. As discussed above, even though both of our protocols are three-party
authentication and key exchange protocol, however, they can be reduced into a two-party authentica-
tion and key exchange protocol. Therefore, in this subsection we prove the security of LAAP1, and in
the similar fashion, we can prove the security evidence for the LAAP2.
Lemma 1 If h is a (t0, q0, ε0)-secure pseudo-random function family with negligible ε0, the
proposed LAAP1 is MA-Secure.
Proof. Assume that there is a polynomial-time adversary A who can break MA-Security of the
proposed protocol P with non-negligible probability SuccMAP (A). We conduct a polynomial time algo-
rithm F using A to show that F can break the pseudo-random function with non-negligible advantage,
too. Besides, SuccAis Succ
MA
P (A) = Pr[SuccE ]+ Pr[SuccN ]- Pr[SuccE , SuccN ]≤Pr[SuccE ]+Pr[SuccN ],
where SuccE and SuccN , respectively, are the events that A successfully impersonates as a legitimate
ED and networks, respectively, to pass authentication. Therefore, we split the proof into two cases.
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One is networks impersonation and the other is the ED impersonation.
Case1(Networks Impersonation):
Assume that A can impersonate as networks with the probability ǫ′. If A wants to be successfully
authenticated by
∏s
E,N controlled by F , A must send correct ResCCS = h(e1|| e2 || Kec).
In the following game , F will exploit the ability of A to break the pseudo-random function
assumption with ǫ′ ≤ 4ǫ0 + 2
−k, where k is the security parameter. F plays the game in Definition
1 with challenger C.
Initialization. Let the size of the long-term secret key Kec , in LAAP1 be k -bit long. C selects
a random bit b ∈ {0,1} and set up a secure one-way hash function hb where h0 = hKec is a pseudo-
random function and h1is a random function. If F simulates the game by using h1 to interact with A,
we denote this game as a random experiment. If F uses h0 to simulate the game, we call this game as
real experiment. The goal of F is to correctly guess hb =h0 or h1 (i.e. b = 0 or 1).
Training. F simulates
∏s
E,N , and
∏t
N,E to interact with A by answering the following queries.
•Execute (
∏s
E,N ,
∏t
N,E): F uses hb provided by C ashKec in the protocol. F also randomly
generates CK and Tseqnew and then computes e1= h(Kec|| Tseq)⊕Tseqnew , e2= h(Kec || IDEDi)⊕
CK, ResCCS = h(e1|| e2 || Kec). Subsequently, F simulates
∏s
E,N ,
∏t
N,E with the help of hb, e1,
e2,and ResCCS .
•Send(
∏s
E,N , m):
∏s
E,N sends the request messagem = {AID, Nx, ReqED,T seq}, of the protocol
.
∏s
E,N first validate ReqED by querying hband then finds the Tseq in it's database and then checks
the correctness of AID , by querying hb.
•Send(
∏t
N,E , m): Ifm = {AID, Nx, ReqED,T seq}, then
∏t
N,E computes e1= h(Kec|| Tseq)⊕Tseqnew
, e2= h(Kec || IDEDi)⊕ CK, ResCCS = h(e1|| e2 || Kec), TN = h(CK || Rn)⊕Track No., ResNAD =
h(Track No. || CK || Rn) by randomly selecting Track No., Rn and querying hb.
∏t
N,E then responds
{e1, e2, ResCCS , ResNAD, TN , Rn} to A.
Challenge. A firstly queries Send(
∏s
E,N , m) to trigger the protocol.
∏s
E,N then sends m =
{AID, Nx, ReqED,T seq} to A. Then A generates the authentication response parameters ResCCS,
ResNAD with the success probability Pr[SuccN ] = ǫ
′. ThusA queries Send(
∏t
N,E , m = {e1, e2, ResCCS,
ResNAD, TN , Rn}. After receiving them F issues two queries x∗ = (e1|| e2 || Kec), y∗ = (Track No.
‖ CK ‖ Rn) to hb and obtains the outputs Res
∗
CCS = h(e1|| e2 || Kec), Res
∗
NAD = h(Track No. ‖ CK
‖ Rn).
Guess. Finally, F outputs a guessing bit b'∈ {0,1}. If Res∗CCS = ResCCS, and Res
∗
NAD = ResNAD,
then F outputs 0; otherwise, F outputs a random bit 0 or 1.
The probability of that A can send out the correct authentication message is ǫ′ in the real exper-
iment and 2−k in the random experiment. Hence we have the following:
Pr
[
b = b′
]
= Pr
[
b = b′, b = 0
]
+ Pr
[
b = b′, b = 1
]
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= (ǫ′ + (1− ǫ′)/2)1/2 + ((1− 2−k)/2)1/2
= 1/2 + ǫ′/4− 2−(k+2)
∈0≥
∣∣Pr [b = b′]− 1/2∣∣ = ǫ′/4− 2−(k+2)
ǫ′ ≤ 4 ∈0 +2
−k
The analysis of the probability of that F successfully distinguishes the given hb(i.e.b = b' )can
be divided into two cases (b = b') under a real experiment i.e. b = 0, and (b = b′) under a random
experiment, i.e. b =1. In case of real experiment, A can successfully send a correct authentication
information to win the game with the probability ǫ′. Hence, F will output b' =0 with probability ǫ′
when A sends a correct authentication information under a real experiment. Besides, if A sends a
wrong information , F can only randomly guess b, i.e. F will outputb' = 0 with probability (1-ǫ′)/2.
Therefore, the probability of (b = b') and (b=0) is (ǫ′+ (1− ǫ′)/2)1/2. In case of random experiment,
A can only send the correct authentication information by randomly guessing with the probability 2−k
and thus F outputs b'=1 with probability (1 - 2−k)/2. Therefore, the probability of (b = b') and (b
=1) is (1-2−k)/2. Therefore, the probability of (b = b') and (b =1) is ((1 - 2−k)/2)1/2.
Case2 (ED Impersonation):
Suppose that A can impersonate as ED with probability ǫ′′. If A wants to be accepted by
∏t
N,E
, then A has to send out the correct authentication information. F plays the game which is the same
as Case1 with C.
Initialization. C selects an hash functionhbaccording to a random bit b∈ {0, 1}for answering the
queries from F where h0 = hKec is a pseudo-random function and h1is a random function.
Training. F firstly selects the required Ne, Tseq in the protocol. F then simulates
∏s
E,N , and∏t
N,E by answering Execute(
∏s
E,N ,
∏t
N,E), Send(
∏s
E,N , m). The simulations of these oracles are
similar to those in Case 1.
Guess. F outputs a guess b'∈ {0,1} according to AID and ReqED. If AID = hk(IDEDi‖ Kec‖
Tseq) and ReqED = h(AID || Ne|| Kec), then F outputs 0, that means hb = hKec ; otherwise it outputs
a random bit 0 or 1.
The probability of that A successfully sends out the correct
AID = hk(IDEDi‖Kec‖Tseq) and ReqED = h(AID || Ne|| Kec) is Pr[SuccE ]= 2
−k in the random
experiment. Hence, we have Pr[b = b′] = 1/2 + ǫ′′/4− 2−(k+2), and ǫ
′′
/4 - 2(k+2), and ǫ
′′
≤ 4ǫ0+ 2
−k.
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The analysis of Pr[b = b′]is similar to that in the proof. of Lemma 1.
By Case 1 and Case 2,
SuccMAP (A) ≤ Pr [SuccN ] + Pr [SuccE ] = ǫ
′ + ǫ′′ ≤ 8ǫ0 + 2
−(k−1)
From the above, ∈0 is non-negligible, which contradicts that ∈0 is negligible. It turns out that
proposed LAAP scheme is MA-Secure.
Lemma 2 If h is a (t0, q0, ε0)-secure pseudo-random function family with negligible ε0, the
proposed LAAP1 is AKE-Secure.
Proof. In Lemma 1 we prove that the proposed protocol P is MA-Secure. Conceive, A is an
adversary who can break AKE-Security of P with non-negligible AdvAKEP (A) =ǫ. We construct a
simulator F using the ability of A to break the pseudo-random function assumption with ǫ≤ǫ0. F
plays the game in Definition 3 with a challenger C.
Initialization. C picks a random bit b{0, 1} and sets up a secure hash function hb for answering
the queries from F where h0 = hKec is a pseudo-random function andh1 is a random function.
Training. F selects the required Ne, Tseq in the protocol. F then simulates
∏s
E,N , and
∏t
N,E
by answering Execute(
∏s
E,N ,
∏t
N,E), Send(
∏s
E,N , m). The simulations of these oracles are similar to
those in the proof of Lemma 1.
•Test(
∏s
E,N ): If CK of
∏s
E,N is generated , F randomly chooses c ∈ {0,1}, and returns the real
session key CK for c = 0 or a random string for c = 1. Otherwise, Freturns⊥denoting meaninglessness.
•Test(
∏t
N,E): The simulation is the same as the above one.
Challenge. After querying Execute(
∏s
E,N ,
∏t
N,E), A sends a Test query to F .
Guess. After querying Test(
∏s
E,N ) or Test(
∏t
N,E), A outputs a bit c
′=0. if A thinks that the
responding string is the real session key; otherwise, c′=1. Finally, F outputs b' = 0 if c' = c; otherwise
F outputs b' = 1. Thus we have the following:
Pr
[
b = b′
]
= Pr
[
b = b′, b = 0
]
+ Pr
[
b = b′, b = 1
]
= 1/2.ǫ+ 1/4 + 1/4 = 1/2 + ǫ/2
ǫ0 ≥ Pr
[
b = b′
]
− 1/2 = ǫ/2
The analysis of the probability of (b = b') is also similar to that in the proof of Lemma 1. A
can win the game by successfully guessing (c = c') with probability (ǫ+ 1/2) under a real experiment
(b = 0). A can only guess (c = c') randomly 1/2 under a random experiment (b =1). If A successfully
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guesses (c = c'), F will output b' =1. Therefore, the probability of (b = b') and (b = 0) is (ǫ+1/2)/2,
and the probability of (b = b') and (b = 1) is 1/4. From the above, ǫ0is non-negligible, and thus a
contradiction occurs. Therefore, AdvAKEP (A) is negligible for each polynomial-time adversary A and
P is AKE-Secure.
Lemma 3 If h is a (t0, q0, ε0)-secure pseudo-random function family with negligible ε0, the
proposed scheme can ensure strong anonymity support.
Proof. In our proposed scheme, both the pseudo identity and one-time-alias identity with trans-
action sequence number can ensure strong anonymity support, which is the combination of the identity
privacy and untraceability. There is not direct relationship between the aliases, where each one-time-
alias identity is generated based on a secure hash function h, which is a pseudo-random function and
in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 it is proved that the ability of A to break the pseudo-random function is
negligible. Besides, it can also be noticed that, during the execution of LAAP1 and LAAP2, none of
the parameter in the request message MA1 , and MB1are allowed to to be sent twice. This approach of
the proposed scheme is quite effective for privacy against eavesdropper (PAE) to achieve.
6 Performance Evaluation
In this Section, we benchmark the performance of the proposed scheme to show that our privacy
preserving approach for fog paradigm is efficient and hence can be useful for various critical IoT
applications and services.
As we mentioned before that, in our proposed scheme we achieve strong anonymity by computing
one-time alias identity AID = f(IDEDi ||Kec||Tseq), where f(.) is a secure one-way hash-function.
However, there are many ways to accomplish strong anonymity support for an entity, where f(.) can be
regarded as one of the following: symmetric key encryption AES-CBC (used as f(.) in [12]), asymmetric
key encryption ECIES (used as f(.) in [13]), modular exponential operation (used as f(.) in [14]),
Chinese reminder theorem (used as f(.) in [15-16]), and the pairing operation (used as f(.) in [17-18]).
In this Section, we demonstrate that our proposed privacy preservation technique is more feasible for the
fog computing environment. In order to do that, here we simulate several cryptographic primitives used
to achieve anonymity in the proposed scheme and others [12-17], using Java Cryptography Extension
(JCE) [19] on a smartphone of HTC One X as a testbed. The smartphone runs Androids 4.1.1 mobile
OS and equipped with 1.5 GHz quad-core ARM Cortex-A9 CPU and 1 GB RAM. For readers' reference,
Table 3 gives the execution time of all the cryptographic operations. From Table 3, it is clear that
secure one-way hash-function will cause less execution time than other cryptographic operations, hence
can ensure expeditious validation in our privacy preserving fog computing model.
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Table 3: Computational Overhead of the Various Cryptographic Operations
Cryptographic Operation Execution Time
Hash Operation (SHA-256) 0.015 ms
Symmetric Key Encryption (AES-CBC) 0.027ms
Asymmetric Key Encryption (ECIES) 1.387 ms
Modular Exponendital Operation with D-H 0.76 ms
Chinese Reminder Theorem 0.63 ms
Pairing Operation 6.827 ms
6.1 Computation and Communication Cost of the Proposed Protocols
Now, we evaluate the required computational costs for all three anonymous authentication protocols
(LAAP1, LAAP2, and LAAP3) for fog computing models. To analyze performance of the LAAP1,
LAAP2, and LAAP3 more comprehensively, here we conduct an experiment. Table 4 lists our ex-
perimental environment, including hardware specifications, used algorithm, link type, and average
transmission time. Table 5 shows that because of the symmetric encryption/decryption during Token
generation, the computational complexity of LAAP3 is little-bit higher than both LAAP1 and LAAP2.
On the other hand, even though all LAAP1, LAAP2, and LAAP3 require the same number of data
flows (four). However, during validation process in LAAP2, and LAAP3 neither EDs nor the NAD
needs to communicate with the CCS, which is assumed to be placed far from NAD and edge devices.
In this way, we minimize the communication cost [ 20] of the system in LAAP2, and LAAP3 which
can be seen in Table 5. After analyzing both LAAP1, LAAP2 and LAAP3, here we categorize the
performances of the proposed scheme into three cases, i.e. the best case, average case and the worst
case.
•Best Case: It indicates the minimal cost during the execution of the authentication process in
the fog computing model. In this case, we consider the successful execution of the initial authentication
process through LAAP1 and all the subsequent authentication process by using LAAP2 or LAAP3.
Therefore, for authenticating ten EDs in our proposed scheme the overall cost will be as follows:
1×LAAP1 + 9×LAAP2 = 443.19 ms or 1×LAAP1 + 9×LAAP3 = 443.92 ms.
•Average Case: It specifies the reasonable cost during the execution of the authentication process
in the fog computing model. In this case, we consider that some of the subsequent authentication
process through LAAP2 may failure. So, we assume 50% of the authentication process will be carried
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out through LAAP1 and rest 50% through LAAP2.. Hence, the overall cost in this case can be
expressed as follows: 5×LAAP1 + 5×LAAP2 = 510.01 ms or 5×LAAP1 + 5×LAAP3 = 510.1 ms.
•Worst Case:: It indicates the maximum cost during the execution of the authentication pro-
cess, which may occur if all the subsequent authentication process by using LAAP2 ot LAAP3 are
unsuccessful, therefore to authenticate ED, NADs require the support of CCS . Therefore, the overall
cost for authentication in this case can be expressed as follows: 10×LAAP1 = 593.55 ms.
Table 4: The Experimental Environment
Hardware Specification
ED: HTC One X with 1.5 GHz Max Turbo Frequency
NAD: ThinkPad E460 with Intel Core i5-5200U and 2.2 GHz Max Turbo Frequency
CCS: ASUS GR8-R047R with Intel Core i7-4510U and 3.1 GHz Max Turbo Frequency
Computation Time (SHA-256) Computation Time (AES-CBC)
ED: ThED = 0.015ms -
NAD: ThNAD = 0.011ms NAD: TSymNAD = 0.023ms
CCS: ThCCS = 0.0092 ms -
Link Type
ED-NAD: One-hop Wireless (802.11)
NAD-CCS:Wired (Internet)
Average Transmission Time
ED-NAD: 10.62 ms
NAD-CCS: 18.96 ms
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Table 5: Computation Cost of the Proposed Schemes
For LAAP1 EDi NAD CCS
Computation Complexity 7ThED 3ThNAD 6ThCCS
Computation Time 0.105 ms 0.033 ms 0.0552 ms
Total Computation Time 0.1932 ms
Average Communication Cost in Time 2×10.62 +2×18.96 = 59.16 ms
Total Cost for Execution 0.1932 +59.16 = 59.353
.
.
For LAAP2 EDj EDi NAD
Computation Complexity 5ThED 6ThNAD 3ThCCS
Computation Time 0.075 ms 0.09 ms 0.027 ms
Total Computation Time 0.192 ms
Average Communication Cost in Time 4×10.62 = 42.48 ms
Total Cost for Execution 0.192 + 42.48 = 42.67 ms
.
.
For LAAP3 EDi NADi NADj
Computation Complexity 5ThED 7ThNAD+2TSymNAD 6ThCCS
Computation Time 0.075 ms 0.123 ms 0.052 ms
Total Computation Time 0.25 ms
Average Communication Cost in Time 4×10.62 = 42.48 ms
Total Cost for Execution 0.25 + 42.48 = 42.73 ms
7 Conclusion
In this article, first we have proposed a new security architecture for fog computing paradigm with some
advance features like D2D communication, etc. Besides, this article has also discussed several security
27
issues in the context of fog computing. Subsequently, we have proposed three lightweight anonymous
authentication protocols (LAAPs) for conventional fog computing and D2D communication aided fog
computing, respectively. Analyses show that our proposed scheme is secure and feasible for resource-
limited devices in IoT.
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